Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public Service
Commission of Utah : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary G. Sackett; Counsel for Mountain Fuel Supply. Attorney for Petitioner
David L. Stott; Public Service Commission of Utah; Counsel for respondent Public Service
Commission of Utah; Laurie Noda; Assistant Attorney General; Counsel for Intervenor Division of
Public Utilities Services; Kent Walgren; Assistant Attorney General; Counsel for Intervenor
Committee of Consumer. Attorneys for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public Service Commission of Utah, No. 910051.00 (Utah Supreme Court,
1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3415

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
45.9
.S9
^
DOCKET N &

BRIBE
,
Ol(0O£l
"•

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO.,
Petitioner,
Case No. 910051
v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

PRIORITY NO. 15

Respondent.

JOINT BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

DAVID L. STOTT, ESQ.
Utah Public Service Commission
160 East 300 South, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 45585
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
(801) 530-6708
Counsel for Respondent Public
Service Commission of Utah

GARY G. SACKETT, ESQ.
Questar Corporation
180 East First South Street
P.O. Box 11150
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
(801) 534-5563
Counsel for Mountain Fuel
Supply Company

LAURIE NODA, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General
36 So. State Street, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 533-3200
Counsel for Intervenor
Division of Public Utilities
Services

KENT WALGREN, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General
36 So. State Street, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 533-3200
Counsel f o r I n t ^ v ^ n c f r
Committee of Consumer ''_„

1

DEC 1 6 1991
CLERK S U P R F 5 ' ^ ^ fny
UT/u.

LIST OF PARTIES
The principal parties to the proceeding below were Mountain
Fuel Supply Company, the Utah Division of Public Utilities, the
Utah Committee of Consumer Services, and the Utah Public Service
Commission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF PARTIES

ii

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

5

ARGUMENT

7

PART I.
A.

B.

C.

D.

TEST YEAR ISSUE

5

MOUNTAIN FUEL'S FAILURE TO MAKE A PROFFER OF FUTURE
TEST YEAR EVIDENCE PRECLUDES IT FROM ASSERTING ON
APPEAL THAT THE COMMISSION'S EXCLUSION OF THAT
EVIDENCE WAS ERROR

7

SINCE MOUNTAIN FUEL FAILED TO REQUEST ANY RELIEF IN
CONNECTION WITH THE TEST YEAR ISSUE, THE APPEAL ON
THIS ISSUE IS MOOT

8

THE COMMISSION TOOK INTO ACCOUNT ECONOMIC
CIRCUMSTANCES IN DECIDING TO USE AN HISTORIC TEAR
YEAR AND PRECLUDE FORECASTED FIGURES

10

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 54-4-4(3) GIVES THE
COMMISSION DISCRETION TO ADOPT OR NOT ADOPT A
FORECASTED TEST YEAR

11

PART II. AVERAGE VERSUS YEAR-END RATE BASE
A.

B.
C.

13

SINCE MOUNTAIN FUEL HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN OF
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE, THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS
ARE CONCLUSIVE

14

THE COMMISSION'S DECISION TO USE AN AVERAGE RATE
BASE IS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

19

EVEN IF THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ORDERING AVERAGE
RATE BASE, MOUNTAIN FUEL HAS NOT SHOWN SUBSTANTIAL
PREJUDICE

22

i

PART III. RATE OF RETURN PENALTY
A.

23

WITHIN A ZONE OF REASONABLENESS, THE COMMISSION HAS
BROAD AUTHORITY TO SET A UTILITY'S RATE OF
RETURN

23

SINCE MOUNTAIN FUEL FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
ON RATE OF RETURN, THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ARE
CONCLUSIVE

29

THE COMMISSION'S ADJUSTMENT TO RATE OF RETURN WAS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

30

B.

C.
CONCLUSION

33

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES;
American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co.,
748 P.2d 1060, 1063 (Utah 1987)

26

Application of Kauai Elec. Division, Etc.,
590 P.2d 524 (Hawaii 1978)

27

Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County,
659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983)

12

Boston First Nat. v. Salt Lake Cty. Bd,
799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990)

14

Bradford v. Alvey & Sons,
621 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Utah 1980)
Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979)
Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp.,
578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978)

8
33
8

Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591, 64 S.Ct. 281 (1944)

25

Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
315 U.S. 575, 62 S.Ct. 736 (1942)

25

First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization,
799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990)

15

General Teleph. Co. of the Southwest v. New Mexico
State Corp. Comm'n,
652 P.2d 1200 (New Mexico 1982)

27

Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review,
776 P.2d 63, 67-8 (Utah App. 1989)

15

Grant v. Utah State Land Bd.,
485 P.2d 1035, 1036-7 (Utah 1971)

12

Gulf Power Co. v. Cresse,
410 So.2d 492 (Florida 1982)

28

Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce,
810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991)

15

LaSalle Teleph. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n,
157 So.2d 455 (Louisiana 1963)

28

iii

MacRae v. Jackson,
526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974)

9

Merriam v. Board of Review,
812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991)
Morton Intern., Inc. v. Auditing Div.,
814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991)

15
6, 13, 23

New England Teleph. and Telegr. Co. v. New Hampshire,
183 A. 2d 237 (New Hampshire 1962)

28

North Carolina ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v.
General Teleph. Co. of the Southeast,
208 S.E.2d 681 (No. Carolina 1974)

27

Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review,
775 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah App. 1989)

15

Re Gas Service, Inc., 69 NH PUC 291, DR 83-345,
Supplemental Order No. 17,061 dated June 4, 1984,
cited at PUR Digest, 3d Series, § 36, Return, at p. 1000

. • 28

Re Northwestern Bell Teleph. Co.,
3 PUR4th 473 (1973)
Reynolds v. Reynolds,
788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah App. 1990)

27
9

Savage Brothers Inc. v. Public Service Commission,
723 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986)

14

South Central Bell Teleph. Co. v. Kentucky Utilities Comm'n,
637 S.W.2d 649 (Kentucky 1982)

27

State ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Commission,
262 U.S. 276, 312, 43 S. Ct. 544, 555 (1923)

27

State v. Rammel,
721 P.2d 498, 499-50 (Utah 1986)

8

Town*of New Shoreham v. Rhode Island Public Util. Comm'n,
464 A.2d 730 (Rhode Island 1983)

33

Utah Dep't of Business Regulation v. Public Service Comm'n,
614 P.2d 1242, 1249 (Utah 1980)

25

Utah Dept. of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
614 P.2d 1242, 1248 (Utah 1980),

17

iv

City of Los Angeles v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
497 P.2d 785, 797 (1972)

17

Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542, 555 (1944)

13

Utah Power and Light Co. v. Public Service Commission,
152 P.2d 542 (Utah 1944)

25

Wickham v. Fisher,
629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981)

9

STATUTES;
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-2

2

Utah Code Ann. § 54-1-1, et seg

13

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4

2, 12

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-19

2

Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 (1990)

2, 25

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15

1

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (g) (1991)

14

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (e) (i) (1990)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14,-16,-17 (1990)

1
1

RULES;
Rule 11(3)(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

14

Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

1

Rule 103(2), Utah Rules of Evidence

7

OTHER;
Priest, Principles of Public Utility Regulation,
Vol. 1. p. 80

33

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 846 (1977)

24

v

APPENDICES
Appendix 1

Utah Code Ann, §§ 54-3-1, 54-4-4, 54-4-21, 54-7-19

Appendix 2

Memorandum from Public Service Commission to the
Parties dated August 27, 1990.

Appendix 3

Letters of Gary Sackett (July 5, 1991), Laurie
Noda (July 10, 1991) and Kent Walgren (July 9,
1991) designating portions of the record to be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for appeal.

Appendix 4

MFS James L. Balthaser Exhibit No. 6.20.

Appendix 5

Joint Exhibit No. 3, pp. 23-4.

vi

JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has appellate jurisdiction over
the appeal of this case by virtue of the following statutes and
rules:

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(i) (1990); Utah Code Ann.

§§ 63-46b-14,-16,-17 (1990), Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15, and Rule
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did Mountain Fuel fail to marshal the evidence before

the Commission on the proper rate base and the adjustment to the
rate of return?
2.

Does Mountain Fuel's failure to proffer evidence on a

future test year preclude the Company from arguing that the
Commission's exclusion of that evidence was error?
3.

Does Mountain Fuel's failure to request any relief on

the test year issue render that issue moot?
4.

Was there substantial evidence to support the

Commission's findings on average rate base and the rate of return
adjustment?
5.

Does the Commission have discretion to order an historic

or future test year?
6.

Has Mountain Fuel been prejudiced by the Commission's

choice of an average rate base?
7.

Does the Commission have the authority, within a range

of reasonableness, to adjust a utility's return for efficiency or
mi smanagement ?
1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes, which are reproduced in full in
Appendix I, are determinative of the issues presented in this
review:

Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-1, 54-4-4, 54-4-21 and 54-7-19.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case (PSC Docket No. 89-057-15) was initiated by the
Public Service Commission in 1989 on its own motion to determine
whether or not the rates Mountain Fuel was charging were just and
reasonable.

There had been no rate hearing for Mountain Fuel

since 1985.

On November 21, 1989, after hearing arguments from

the parties and taking administrative notice of the current
economic conditions, the Commission bench-ordered a 1989
historical test year.

On January 22, 1990, the Division filed a

motion to consolidate the rate hearing with Docket 90-057-02
(Mountain Fuel's gas cost pass-through proceeding).
Commission granted that motion.

The

Hearings began on September 5,

1990 and continued through oral arguments on September 28, 1990.
On November 21, 1990, the Commission issued its Report and
Order increasing Mountain Fuel's rates by approximately $76,000.
On December 21, 1990, Mountain Fuel filed an Application for
Rehearing.

On January 10, 1991, the Commission issued its Order

denying Mountain Fuel's Application for Rehearing, except for one
minor issue on which the Commission suggested a possible
stipulation.

R. at 2164. The parties were unable to reach a

stipulation.

On February 8, 1991, Mountain Fuel filed a Petition

for Review and on March 1, 1991 filed its Docketing Statement
2

with the Court.

On February 14, 1991 the Committee of Consumer

Services filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and on February
22, 1991, the Division of Public Utilities filed a similar
Motion.

These motions were subsequently granted by the Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent and Intervenors agree with Mountain Fuel's
Statement of Facts with the following exceptions:
1.

In the November 21, 1989 arguments on the proper test

year, Mountain Fuel states that the PSC took no evidence.1

The

Commission did take administrative notice of the rate of
inflation during the period since the Company's last rate case.
R. at 39-40.
2.

Although the Commission did not articulate in detail its

reasons for ordering an historical test year on November 21,
1989, those reasons were articulated in its Report and Order
issued on November 21, 1990. Mountain Fuel never requested that
the Commission articulate its reasons prior to issuance of its
November 21, 1990 Report and Order.
3.

On August 27, 1990, a week before the hearings

commenced, the Commission sent the parties of record a Memorandum
which stated:
In this docket, parties differ on whether year-end
or average rate base is appropriate for test period
purposes. We intend to resolve the dispute early in
the proceeding.
As the first matter to be taken up when the
hearing begins, each party will be expected to present,
1

Opening Brief of Mountain Fuel at 5.
3

through its attorney or a designated witness, a concise
statement of the reasons for its choice. Among other
things, each statement must address, first, our use in
recent U S West and Utah Power & Light cases of average
rate base in conjunction with historic test years, and
second, the problem this choice creates for matching
test year revenues, expenses, and rate base.2
In response, on August 31, 1990, the Division filed the
surrebuttal testimony of Carl L. Mower.

The Committee responded

on September 4, 1990 by filing a "Statement on Year-end versus
Average Rate Base..." consisting of pp. 3-8 of the prefiled
surrebuttal testimony of Michael Arndt.

On September 5, 1990, at

the beginning of the rate hearing, James Balthaser testified on
the issue for Mountain Fuel and Carl L. Mower for the Division.
Committee witness Arndt, who lives in Iowa, was not scheduled to
testify until September 12, 1990. Although the Commission had
indicated a desire to rule immediately on the year-end versus
average rate base issue (R. at 15-6), Mountain Fuel's objection
to the receipt of Mr. Arndt's pre-filed testimony prior to crossexamination foreclosed the Commission from entering an early
ruling on the issue.

The Committee's statement on year end vs.

average rate base (Arndt Surrebuttal, pp. 3-8) was admitted when
Mr. Arndt appeared personally to testify on September 12, 1990.3
Mountain Fuel's assertion that the Committee's position statement
on this issue was never made a part of the record* is,
therefore, mistaken.
2

R. at 1672. Appendix 2.

3

See R. at 651-2, 45-7, 62, 94-6, 101-02..

A

Opening Brief of Mountain Fuel at 38.
4

4.

Other misstatements of fact, and statements of fact not

based upon the record before the Court on appeal, are noted in
the text of the Brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Test Year*

Mountain Fuel's arguments against the

Commission's choice of a 1989 historic test year must fail
because:

1.

test year. 2.

The Company never proffered the results of a future
Since Company failed to request any relief on the

test year issue, the appeal moot. 3.

The Commission has

discretion under Utah law to order an appropriate test year.
Rate Base.

Since Mountain Fuel failed to marshal the

evidence supporting the Commission's use of an average rate base,
the Commission's findings are conclusive.

In addition, the

findings on average rate base were based on substantial evidence.
Finally, even if the Commission did err on this issue, the error
was harmless.
Rate of Return.

Since Mountain Fuel failed to marshal the

evidence supporting the Commission's adjustment to the Company's
rate of return, those findings are conclusive; nevertheless, the
rate of return adjustment was supported by substantial evidence.
Within a range of reasonableness, the Commission has broad
authority to set a utility's rate of return.
PART I.

TEST YEAR ISSUE

Standard of Review on Test Year Issue.

5

The test year issue

raised by Mountain Fuel in this appeal5 has to do with whether
or not as a matter of law Mountain Fuel has the right to submit,
and the Commission is required to consider, a future or
forecasted test period in a rate proceeding. The plain language
of Section 54-4-4(3) (1990) gives the Commission discretion to
consider a future test period:
The Commission, in its determination of just and
reasonable rates, may consider recent changes in
the utility's financial condition or changes
reasonably expected, but not speculative, in the
utility's revenues, expenses or investments and
may adopt an appropriate future test period, not
exceeding twelve months from the date of filing,
including projections or projections together with
a period of actual operations in determining the
utility's test year for ratemaking purposes.
(Emphasis added.)
Mountain Fuel argues that the term "may" really means
"shall" and that the Commission is mandated to consider any
forecasts of future economic circumstances Mountain Fuel wishes
to put before it. The construction of terms in a statute would
appear to be something for the Court to undertake as a purely
legal function. However, the exclusion of a future test period in
a given case is based upon practical considerations "subject to
the Commission's expertise, gleaned from its accumulated
practical, first-hand experience with the subject matter."6

But

3

Part I of the Brief of Respondent and Intervenors deals with
Part I, Sections A-F of Mountain Fuel's Brief. Part I, Section G
of that Brief, which deals with the proper rate base, is a separate
issue from the proper test year and is addressed in Respondent's
and Intervenors' Brief in Part II.
6

Morton Intern., Inc. v. Auditing Div. , 814 P.2d 581, 587
(Utah 1991) .
6

whether or not a correction-of-error standard is applied to this
issue or a deference standard is applied because of the
Commission's experience, the result should be the same.
ARGUMENT
A.

MOUNTAIN FUEL'S FAILURE TO MAKE A PROFFER OF
FUTURE TEST YEAR EVIDENCE PRECLUDES IT FROM
ASSERTING ON APPEAL THAT THE COMMISSION'S
EXCLUSION OF THAT EVIDENCE WAS ERROR.

Mountain Fuel has alleged that the Commission erred in
ordering an historical test period based on actual hard data and
in precluding the use of a. future test period.

There were

several practical, common-sense reasons why the Commission
decided to use historical information and those will be discussed
hereafter.

But quite apart from those reasons, Mountain Fuel

never made a proffer of the potential difference in rates the use
of a future test period would make. In other words, while
Mountain Fuel argued very strenuously that it be allowed to place
its forecasted test period before the Commission,7 it never
explained to the Commission how and in what degree the use of
projected data as opposed to actual data would make a difference
in the Company's revenue requirement or rates ultimately arrived
at by the Commission.
Rule 103(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that error
may not be predicated upon a ruling which excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and an offer
of proof is made.

This Court has consistently held that a

7

R. at 3-17, 18-36. Arguments on the proper test year were
heard by the Commission on November 21, 1989.
7

party's failure to make a proffer as to what the excluded
evidence would show precludes that party from asserting on appeal
that the exclusion of the evidence was error.8 Mountain Fuel
should be precluded from alleging error on the Commission's part
because it failed to show that the allegation made any
difference.
Mountain Fuel's failure to proffer is critical in
considering the appeal it has filed. Its failure made it
impossible for the Commission or this Court on review to conclude
that the use of projected as opposed to actual historical data
would make any difference.

The consideration, therefore, of

Mountain Fuel's argument at this point is moot, and the statutory
interpretation which Mountain Fuel requests would amount to no
more than an advisory opinion.
B.

SINCE MOUNTAIN FUEL FAILED TO REQUEST ANY RELIEF
IN CONNECTION WITH THE TEST YEAR ISSUE, THE APPEAL
ON THIS ISSUE IS MOOT.

Mountain Fuel alleges that the Commission has erred in
refusing to consider a future test period in this case and
requests that the Court remand the issue to the Commission with
instructions to require the Commission to consider a future test
period.

The Company's request does not specify what test period

that would be.

The forecasted test period Mountain Fuel wanted

the Commission to consider in this case no longer exists.
Mountain Fuel has nowhere requested that the Commission be
8

State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499-50 (Utah 1986); Bradford
v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Utah 1980); Downey State Bank
v. Maior-Blakenev Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978).
8

ordered to consider on remand what is now historical data and
retroactively set rates. Mountain Fuel can only be asking the
Court to order the Commission in the future to permit Mountain
Fuel as a matter of legal right to present whatever forecasted
test period data it wishes and to make findings.9

That request

is very simply a request for an advisory opinion from the
Court.10
9

In its Application for Rehearing, Mountain Fuel stated
specifically that it did not want the Commission in this case to
order a future test year:
The Company is not requesting that the Commission
reopen the record in this case to establish a future test
year.
To do so would only worsen the effects of
regulatory lag that the Report and Order has created.
However, the Commission should modify the Report and
Order to recognize that the test-year determination
should be made only after the applicant for rate relief
and other interested parties have presented evidence
concerning the state of the economy.... (emphasis added)
R. at 2105.
10

The Utah Supreme Court has a judicial policy against
rendering advisory opinions:
Because of a longstanding judicial policy in Utah to
avoid advisory opinion, we do not generally consider
mooted questions on appeal.... "The function of appellate
courts, like that of courts generally, is not to give
opinions on merely abstract or theoretical matters, but
only to decide actual controversies injuriously affecting
the rights of some party to the litigation, and it has
been held that questions or cases which have become moot
or academic are not a proper subject of review."
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah App. 1990), guoting
But see,
MacRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974).
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P. 2d 896 (Utah 1981), where the Court
recognized an exception to the mootness rule where the issue "is of
wide concern, affects the public interest, is likely to recur in a
similar manner, and, because of the brief time any one person is
affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial review." JTd. at
899 (citations omitted). In order to qualify for the exception,
all four of the tests must be met. The exception would not apply
to the instant case because the issue is of concern only to the
(continued...)
9

C.

THE COMMISSION TOOK INTO ACCOUNT ECONOMIC
CIRCUMSTANCES IN DECIDING TO USE AN HISTORIC TEAR
YEAR AND PRECLUDE FORECASTED FIGURES.

Mountain Fuel argues that the Commission arbitrarily
rejected the Company's petition to submit a projected test year.
That argument ignores several significant factors. First, this
particular rate proceeding was initiated at Commission request.
Mountain Fuel had not filed a rate case for over five years.
Since a for-profit company such as Mountain Fuel will never
ignore the bottom line in dealing with consumers, it is safe to
conclude that the most significant reason why Mountain Fuel
didn't file a rate case for so many years (in fact it has still
not done so despite its allegations of mistreatment by the
Commission in this case) is that economic conditions have been
stable and the utility's rates adequate to cover expenses and
return profits to shareholders.

The Commission noted that fact

in determining to use an historic test year.

What the Commission

wanted to learn out of this proceeding was whether or not a rate
reduction might be justified; whether or not Mountain Fuel's
costs should actually be lower than they were, especially given
the extent of Mountain Fuel's affiliate relationships and in
particular its dependence for gas supply upon its affiliate
parent, Questar.n
10

(. . .continued)
Company and could be resolved through either an interlocutory
appeal or a request for a declaratory ruling.
11

Report and Order issued November 21, 1960 at 3-7. R. at
1965-7. Order on Application for Rehearing issued January 10, 1991
at 3. R. at 2163.
10

Second, the Commission took administrative notice of the
fact that the rate of inflation had been consistently low for
quite some time, suggesting that costs and investor expectations
were relatively level, if not declining.12
What the Commission wished to avoid was extensive and timeconsuming debate and argument in the case about the accuracy of
forecasted data.13

While it is true that the Division of Public

Utilities was willing to have Mountain Fuel submit forecasted
data, it would necessarily have to analyze that data and
doubtless would contest Mountain Fuel's accuracy on some or many
points as it has in the past. Clearly, if economic conditions had
been as volatile as they were for example in the mid-1970s and
early 1980s, and Mountain Fuel had so argued, the Commission
would have allowed the submission of the forecasted test period.
In summary, Mountain Fuel simply failed to argue
persuasively that the time and effort required for the use of a
forecasted test period were justified given revailing economic
circumstances.
D.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 54-4-4(3) GIVES THE
COMMISSION DISCRETION1 TO ADOPT OR NOT ADOPT A
FORECASTED TEST YEAR. *

Mountain Fuel argues that as a matter of legal right it is
entitled to submit a forecasted test period and the Commission
12

R. at 39-40.

13

Report and Order issued November 21, 1990 at 3. R. at 1965.

1A

The Committee does not participate in this section of the
Brief. It does, however, join in the arguments on mootness and
failure to proffer.
11

must consider it.

The plain language of the statute says

otherwise:
(3) The Commission, in its determination of just and
reasonable rates, may consider recent changes in the
utility's financial condition...and may adopt an
appropriate future test period....
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(3) (1990).

In effect Mountain Fuel is

arguing that "may" actually means "shall." A more reasonable
interpretation of 54-4-4(3), given the circumstances of the
passage of the legislation, is that an historical test period
based on hard historical data is the normal or default test
period to be used.15

The burden is on the utility to show that

general economic circumstances are sufficiently unstable as to
warrant the use of forecasted data. In short, before the
Commission elects to consider forecasted data, it would need to
find first that the state of the economy required consideration
of speculative future factors in order to justify a departure
from the safety and reliability of hard historical data.

In this

case Mountain Fuel did not meet that burden. As the Commission
stated on page 7 of its November 21, 1990 Order in this Docket:
In future proceedings, the Commission will decide
15

The general rule is that "may" is discretionary and "shall"
mandatory. See Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 485 P.2d 1035, 1036-7
(Utah 1971); Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake
County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983).
The only exception to the rule is where it is clear from the
context that the legislature intended otherwise. § 54-4-4(3) was
passed by the Legislature in 1975 with the support of the
Commission and at the request of public utility companies to allow
the Commission to deal more effectively with high inflation and
rapid increases in costs. It was never intended to require the
Commission to consider evidence of a future test year during stable
economic periods in which there was low inflation.
12

issues concerning test year, rate base, out-ofperiod adjustments, and related matters prior to
the onset of hearings and based on the then
existing conditions of the utility and the economy
in which it is operating.16 (emphasis added,)
PART II. AVERAGE VERSUS YEAR-END RATE BASE.
Standard of Review on Rate Base Issue, The term "rate base"
is not used in the Public Utilities Code (Utah Code Ann. § 54-11, et seq.).

The following sections, however, speak broadly

about valuation of a utility's assets: § 54-4-4(3) (the
Commission may consider recent or reasonably expected future
changes in the utility's "investments"); § 54-4-21 (the
Commission has the power to value a utility's property); and §
54-7-19 (the procedure for valuation of utilities).

The only

judicially imposed limitations on the Commission's power to
determine rate base in Utah are procedural due process and that
the rate established be just and reasonable.17
Other than the question of whether there was "substantial
evidence" to support the Commission's decision, it is apparent
that on issues relating to the valuation of rate base the
Commission's "expertise gleaned from its accumulated practical,
first-hand experience with the subject matter"18 is fundamental.
With the exception of reviewing the quantum of evidence the Court

16

R. at 1969, 2163.

17

Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 155,
152 P.2d 542, 555 (1944).
18

Morton Intern. Inc. v. Auditing Div. , 814 P.2d 581, 587
(Utah 1991) .
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should, therefore, grant considerable deference to the
Commission's findings and conclusions in this area.19
A.

SINCE MOUNTAIN FUEL HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN OF
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE, THE COMMISSION'S
FINDINGS ARE CONCLUSIVE.

Mountain Fuel argues that the Commission's order to use an
average rather than a year-end rate base is not based on
sufficient record evidence.

Rule 11(3)(e)(2) of the Utah Rules

of Appellate Procedure requires that:
[I]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary
to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1991) permits a court to grant
relief on appeal if:
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court.
In Boston First Nat, v. Salt Lake Ctv. Bd., the Utah Supreme
Court interpreted this provision of Utah's Administrative
Procedures Act:
An appellate court applying the "substantial evidence
test" must consider both the evidence that supports the
Tax Commission's factual findings and the evidence that
detracts from the findings (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, the party challenging the findings—in
this case, the taxpayer—must marshal all of the
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite
the supporting facts, the Tax Commission's findings are
not supported by substantial evidence (note omitted).
799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990).
19

If an appellant fails to meet

JId. at 586-7.
See also Savage Brothers Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, 723 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986).
14

its burden of marshalling the evidence, "the Board's findings of
operative facts are conclusive."20

In Heinecke v. Dept. of

Commerce,21 the Utah Court of Appeals chided the appellant for
marshalling not only the evidence supporting the Division's
findings, but reviewing in minute detail all the evidence before
the Board and "emphasizing the evidence that supported his
position," leaving it to the court "to sort out what evidence
actually supported the findings" (emphasis in original).22
These cases require that Mountain Fuel not only designate
the relevant record for appeal, but also gather together and
refer in its Opening Brief to all of the evidence supporting the
Commission's findings and then show that that evidence is not
"substantial."23

As detailed below, Mountain Fuel not only

failed to cite the record evidence supporting the Commission's
findings on average versus year-end rate base, it failed to

20

Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 441
(Utah App. 1989). See also Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d
447, 450 (Utah App. 1991).
21

810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991).

22

Id.. In a note, the Court stated:
Evidence contrary to the findings becomes relevant when
the court scrutinizes the supporting evidence under the
"substantial evidence viewed in light of the whole
record" test (reference omitted), but this is a distinct
and subsequent analytic step (citation omitted)(emphasis
in original).
23

Although the cases leave some room for dispute on the
precise meaning of "substantial evidence," it is clear that it is
something more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance.
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-8 (Utah App.
1989); First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of Egualization, 799 P.2d
1163, 1165 (Utah 1990).
15

request that the greater part of that evidence be designated as
part of the record on appeal.
In the hearings before the Commission, the only party
recommending an average rate base was the Committee.

The

Committee's witness on this issue was Michael Arndt, a Certified
Public Accountant with 16 years' experience in public utility
accounting.

R. at 2414-16. Mr. Arndt presented the following

testimony on the average versus year-end rate base issue:

Direct

Testimony (R. at 2620-22); Rebuttal Testimony (R. at 2590-92);
Surrebuttal Testimony (R. at 2569-74); and he testified on the
stand on that issue (R. at 652-5, 657-8, 673, 680-5, 686-91, 69599, 715-18).

Mountain Fuel did not designate any of these forty

pages as part of the record on appeal,2A and referred to only
two of these pages in its Brief.25

The Division of Public

Utilities also presented evidence on the average versus year-end
rate base issue.26

The testimony of Division witness Mary

24

See R. at 2247-8 for Mountain Fuel's designation of the
record for appeal.
The Committee requested that the evidence
presented by Mr. Arndt be designated part of the record for appeal.
See July 9, 19 91 letter from Kent Walgren, Attorney for the
Committee, to Stephen C. Hewlett, Commission Secretary. Appendix
3.
25

See Mountain Fuel's Opening Brief at 32 (statement of the
Committee position) and at 38 (brief summary of the Committee
position). The two references to the record are: R. at 654, 680.
26

Carl L. Mower: Surrebuttal (R. at 2404-25); Stand (R. at
84-101, 483-512). Chester Sullivant: Direct (R. at 2470-75);
Exhibit 1.12 (R. at 2448); Surrebuttal (R. at 2454-8); Stand (R. at
519-20, 527, 531-40). Mary Cleveland: Surrebuttal (R. at 290205); Stand (R. at 625-34, 640-47); Exhibit 6.4 (R. at 2936-43).
In Mountain Fuel's letter of July 5, 1991 to the Commission
Secretary designating portions of the record to be transmitted to
(continued...)
16

Cleveland, part of which supports the Commission's findings in
this area, was neither designated for appeal by Mountain Fuel,
nor mentioned in its Brief.27
The critical problem with use of a year-end rate base is
that adjustments must be made to company investment, revenues and
expenses in order to "synchronize" the test-year.28

The total

revenues and expenses for the twelve months of a test year are in
effect automatically averaged.29

Thus if a year-end rate base

is used, as proposed by Mountain Fuel, expenses and revenues must
also be adjusted to year-end levels. To the extent that
increasing revenues are not synchronized with an increasing year-

26

( . . .continued)
the Supreme Court (R. at 2247-8) the testimony of Mary Cleveland,
the importance of which is discussed below, was excluded. The
Division had to request that Ms. Cleveland's testimony be
designated part of the record for appeal. See Appendix 3.
27

R. at 2247-8. The Direct, Surrebuttal and Exhibits of Ms.
Cleveland were made a part of the record by the Division. See
letter dated July 10, 1991 from Laurie Noda, the Division's
attorney, to Stephen C. Hewlett, Commission Secretary. Appendix 3.
28

This Court has acknowledged the requirement that a test year
be synchronized:
The commission may adjust all figures, revenue, expense,
and investment for anticipated changes, but it may not
•adjust one side or part of the equation without adjusting
the other; unless there is a finding the particular
expense is extraordinary.
Utah Dept. of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d
1242, 1248 (Utah 1980), quoting City of Los Angeles v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 497 P.2d 785, 797 (1972)..
29

I.e. , whether revenues and expenses during the test year are
going up or down, the effect of totaling them for the 12 months of
the test year is to effectively arrive at an average number for the
year.
17

end rate base, the utility will receive a windfall.
Mountain Fuel argues in its Brief that by using an average
rate-base, the Commission understated the Company's rate-base by
$9,542,000,31 the revenue effect of which is an understatement
of approximately $1,421,758.32

In addition to taking the

$9,542,000 figure from an exhibit which has not been designated
part of this record for appeal,33 Mountain Fuel nowhere mentions
in its Brief that there was evidence before the Commission that
the Company's revenues were increasing throughout the test-year:
The Company filed its case using a year end rate
30

The "windfall" occurs because the test year does not take
into account increased revenues that the company actually receives.
For example, if, as here, rate-base is increasing and expenses are
constant (R. at 644, 646), but the number of customers (and fuel
consumption) is increasing throughout the test-year, revenues would
have to be adjusted (moved six months forward) in order to "match"
the rate base and expenses.
The more matching required, the
greater the impetus to move the test period forward six months.
Mower, Surrebuttal, 8/31/90, R. at 15. In this case, the Division
recommended that if the Commission were to accept the Company's
proposed post-test year adjustments, the test-year be "rolled"
forward six months. Mower Surrebuttal, 8/31/90, R. at 2419. When
asked by Commissioner Byrne what that would entail, Mr. Mower
stated that it would take "a month or so" to update all of the
numbers. Mower, Redirect, 9/10/90, R. at 485. Mr. Mower testified
that because the Commission had ordered a 1989 historical testyear, the Division had concentrated its auditing on the 1989
calendar year and had not examined 1990 data in detail. Mower
Surrebuttal, 9/31/90, R. at 2415; Mower , Stand, 9/10/90, R. at
485-6; Mower, Stand, 9/5/90, R. at 100-01.
31

Opening Brief at 36.

32

The revenue impact is obtained by multiplying $9,542,000 by
the overall rate of return (11.03%) and a tax gross-up factor of
1.351.
33

The Company obtains its figure of $9,54 2,000 from page 9,
line 4, of Joint Exhibit 2, dated September 26, 1990. Joint
Exhibit 2 is part of the evidence which Mountain Fuel did not
designate as part of the record in this appeal. R. at 2247-8.
18

base and certain expenses annualized to the end of year
levels. The Company did not attempt to calculate
revenues on year end levels.3A
The result is that in the rate hearing the Company was proposing
an unsynchronized test year that failed to take into account the
increase in customer levels and revenues between July 1, 1989 and
December 31, 1989. Although the Company claimed that long-term
trends indicated that its new customers were using less fuel than
existing customers, that assertion was convincingly disputed by
Division witness Mary Cleveland.35
The above referenced record evidence, all of which is
essential in order to reach a reasoned decision on the issue of
average versus year-end rate base, was neither designated part of
the record for appeal by Mountain Fuel nor discussed anywhere in
its Brief.
B.

THE COMMISSION'S DECISION TO USE AN AVERAGE
RATE BASE IS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

In its Report and Order,36 the Commission gave the
following reasons for its decision to use average rather than
year-end rate base:
3A

Division of Public Utilities Statement Concerning the Use
of a Year End Test Year, September 5, 1990, sponsored by Carl
Mower. R. at 2422-25, 2404-21, 483-512, esp. at 2424, 2414-15,
483-4.
The "certain expenses" annualized to year-end levels
(December 31, 1989) were wage and labor overhead expenses. The
Commission approved these increased expenses, which totaled
$1,027,000. Report and Order issued November 21, 1990, at 13 (R.
at 1975).
35

R. at 625, 631, 633-4, 640-1.
testimony on the stand: R. at 533.
36

See also Mr. Sullivant's

Report and Order issued November 21, 1990 at pp. 3-10 (R.
at 1956-72).
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1.

There was no need for attrition adjustments because the

rate of inflation was low and Mountain Fuel's rates had been
stable or declining since 1985.37
2.

The Commission had relied on average rate base in recent

U S West and Utah Power and Light dockets and Mountain Fuel
produced no compelling reason to depart from that practice, R. at
1970.
3.

Average rate base matches with annual flows of revenues

and expenses. R. at 1970. Year-end rate base requires
substantial, difficult adjustments to revenues and expenses,
fraught with policy implications. R. at 1970.
4.

Year-end rate base, "a mere snapshot", gives a

potentially misleading picture of rate base at a given point in
time. R. at 1970.
The following record evidence supports the Commission's
findings:
1.

Lack of need for an attrition adjustment: Transcript,

Nov. 21, 1989 (R. at 39-40); Sullivant Surrebuttal (R. at 2456);
Arndt Surrebuttal (R. at 2572-3); Arndt, Stand (R. at 673, 717).
2.

Consistency with practice toward other utilities: Arndt

Direct (R. at 2621); Arndt Rebuttal (R. at 2573); Arndt, Stand
(R. at 685); Mower, Stand, 9/10/90 (R. at 497).
3.

Average rate base matches revenues and expenses; year-

end rate base requires difficult adjustments: Arndt Direct (R.

37

R. at 1965-66. The Commission also noted that the Company
had not sought rate relief since 1985.
20
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from Chairman Stewart, Mr

- response to a question

Mower testif:- : ::.-t even thougl I the

Division was "official ly" recommending a year-end rate base, 1 I i s
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• :

Com> Stewart: Again, Mr. Mower, you are answering
questions about matching. Matching is an issue that we
will talk about later. I'm asking you as a senior
regulator in this state, one who has been around longer
than just about anybody in this room, if you had your
choice between an average test year and the year end
test year , whi cl I would yen i select i i :t advance of a case?
The Witness (Mr. Mower): I would feel most
comfortable with an average test year, but in this case
we feel that we have made those reasonable calculations
to take it to year end.
Com. Stewart; Do you think the data then that
presented by the Division to the Commission, by all
your arguments regarding matching, is going to give
as accurate information as if we had selected an
average test year at the beginning and instructed
parties to deal with an average test year?

is
of
us
1

The Witness (Mr. Mower): The calculations that we
have made show that there would not be much difference
in the revenue requirement from what we are
recommending on a year end basis to what it woi i 1 :i I: »e • DI I
2]

an average basis even if you update the test year to
more current data.
R. at 86-7. Finally, even Mountain Fuel offered evidence
supporting the Committee recommendation and Commission decision.
Company witness James L. Balthaser sponsored an exhibit which
showed that the states of Washington, Montana, Louisiana,
Tennessee, Maine, South Dakota, Iowa and New Hampshire all use an
historic test year with an average rate base.38
C.

EVEN IF THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ORDERING AVERAGE RATE
BASE, MOUNTAIN FIJEL HAS NOT SHOWN SUBSTANTIAL
PREJUDICE.

Section 63-46b-16(4) (1991) of Utah's Administrative
Procedures Act permits the Court to grant relief "only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced" based upon a
determination of fact that is not supported by substantial
evidence.
The weight of evidence establishes that whether one uses an
average or year-end rate base, once revenues are synchronized,
the revenue requirement of the Company is approximately the
same,39

According to Division witness Mary Cleveland,

annualization of customer use to December 31, 1989 (year-end),

38

James L. Balthaser Exhibit No. 6.20. Since this exhibit was
neither designated part of the record on appeal, nor marshaled by
the Company as evidence supporting the Commission's findings, it is
included herein as Appendix 4.
39

Mower, Surrebuttal, August 31, 1990. R. at 2419. Mower,
Stand, 9/10/90. R- at 505, 508. Mower, Stand, 9/5/90. R. at 87.
Sullivant, Surrebuttal, August 31, 1990. R. at 2457-8. Sullivant,
Stand. R. at 520, 531, 533-4, 538.
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Standard of Review on Rate of Return Penalty Issue,
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ordt

f-j*" - argument that the Commission lacks authority \
' - *

applies
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•
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A.

WITHIN A ZONE OF REASONABLENESS, THE COMMISSION HAS
BROAD AUTHORITY TO SET A UTILITY'S RATE OF RETURN.
; -• _ r . . :,f.s nn inherent

Exhibit DPU u . JL , rev .

(IUUI

uiaa, L U I u m n E) . R.

5

906 •

A1

The two items which must be added back into rate base to
arrive at year-end levels are depreciation
($250,000) and
production-related depreciation ($277,000). Joint Exhibit 3, pp.
23-4.
These two pages, which were not designated part of the
record : r appeal, are attached hereto as Appendix 5.

3

Morton Intern., Inc. v. Auditing Div. , 8 ] 4 P. 2d 581, 587
p t -• ' 1991) .
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authority to impose a penalty*4 to rate of return and that the
Commission has limited powers to impose penalties and other
punitive measures/5

The Company, however, fails to address the

fact that the Commission's 12.1% rate of return was within the
range of rates established by expert testimony;46 nor does it
argue that the return resulted in unjust or unreasonable rates.
Respondent and Intervenors contend that the Commission has
broad discretion to set a utility's rate of return as long as it
is within a range of reasonableness. Section 54-4-4(1) of Utah's
Public Utility Code provides that the Commission has the
authority to determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates
of a utility.

Section 54-3-1 describes what the Commission can

take into account in determining a just and reasonable rate:
The scope of definition "just and reasonable" may
include, but shall not be limited to, the cost of
providing service to each category of customer,
economic impact of charges on each category of
customer, and on the well-being of the state of Utah;
methods of reducing wide periodic variations in demand
of such products, commodities or services, and means of
AA

At pages 40 and 41 of its Opening Brief, Mountain Fuel
argues that the use of the term "penalty" by the Commission in the
Table of Contents of its November 21, 1990 Report and Order is
somehow significant. It is clear from the Order itself, however,
that even if the Commission had used the term "penalty" (rather
than adjustment) throughout its Order, that term would have been
intended in its generic sense of a "disadvantage, loss, or
hardship" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 846 (1977)), and not
in the narrow sense in which it is used in Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-724 through -29 (1990).
A5

Petitioner's Opening Brief, page 40.

A6

Mountain Fuel did not request that any of the record
testimony or evidence dealing with rate of return be designated
part of the record for appeal—not even that of its own witness J.
Peter Williamson. R. at 2247-8. This issue is dealt with below.
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encouraging conservation > t rHbourceb diiii ineiyy.
(emphasis added)
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return" is nowhere specifically mentioned, t h e Court h a s
recognized that * ' ~ Commission m a y look at various facn-i;, in
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In Utah Power and Light C o .

v. Public Service Commission 4 7 (Utah Power • , r* semina 1 case i :n
w h i c h the Utah Supreme i' •..

i IHIPTII Unit*

St at e s Suprerne Court cases de a 1in g w j 1. h rate o£ re t u r n / 8 t his
Court stated:
The Hope case stands squarely for the doctrine that it
is t h e final impact of t h e rate order w h i c h is
controlling insofar as Federal constitutional
limitations a r e concerned. So long as t h e rate set
does n o t confiscate t h e property devoted to public
s e r v i c e , t h e rate order will not be held to v i o l a t e
substantive constitutional p r i n c i p l e s . T h e legislature
is free t o determine its own economic policy in regard
to the fixing of r a t e s , Its power to set rates i s ,
h o w e v e r , still circumscribed b y t w o constitutional
l i m i t a t i o n s : (1) substantive constitutional l a w
requires that the rates finally set shall n o t b e
confiscatory; and (2) the requirements of procedural
due process m u s t still be followed.
1 5 1 1". 2(i a t l:/'i .'i

This principle, which Is "known as the ""end

result d o c t r i n e , " has become a bedrock of public* utility law in
the Un i I H I Ptafp;-*
r1

i|IJI

15? P 2d 54?

In

I lie Commission's
).

A8

Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. , 315 U.S.
575, 62 S.Ct. 736 (1942); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 320 U.S. 591 , 64 S.Ct, 281 (1944).
A9

T h e notion that a rate is just and reasonable if it permits
the u t i l i t y t o "recover its costs of service and a reasonable
return on t h e value of property devoted to public u s e " h a s been
reaffirmed b v - r.: s Court m o r e recently in Utah D e p ; t of Business
(conti nued. )
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duties with regard to rate of return, the Court in Utah Power
went on to state:
What annual rate will constitute just compensation
depends upon many circumstances, and must be determined
by the exercise of a fair and enlightened judgment,
having regard to all relevant facts...The return should
be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the
financial soundness of the utility and should be
adequate, under efficient and economical management, to
maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise
the money necessary for the proper discharge of its
public duties.
152 P.2d at 568.
What is critically absent in Mountain Fuel's appeal of the
Commission's decision relating to the rate of return adjustment
is any argument or evidence that the reduction in rate of return
from 12.2% to 12.1% resulted in rates which were confiscatory or
otherwise illegal.

The Company argues that because the

legislature has nowhere given the Commission specific statutory
authority to adjust rate of return as a way of addressing
mismanagement of affiliate relations, the Commission is limited
to disallowing certain expenses.50 The issue, however, is not
whether the Commission has authority to set a rate of return.
Even though "rate of return" is nowhere mentioned in the Public
Utility Code, Mountain Fuel does not dispute the Commission's
49

( . . .continued)
Regulation v. Public Service Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242, 1249 (Utah
1980). See also, American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co., 748 P.2d
1060, 1063 (Utah 1987) .
50

Opening Brief at 41. In Utah Power, the Court stated that
the Commission could make an adjustment for Utah Power & Light's
expenses of issuing and selling preferred stock by either adjusting
the company's rate base or making an adjustment in rate of return.
152 P.2d at 562.
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^ r e e state supreme courts, Louisiana,

New Hampshire and Florida, have held that a higher return on

The United States Supreme
right to earn a fair return [may]
that reasonable efficiency be
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
U.S. 276, 312, 43 S. Ct. 544, 555

Court has suggested that "the
be limited by the requirement
exercised."
State ex rel,
Public Service Commission, 167
(1923).

53

North Carolina ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. General Teleph.
Co. of the Southeast, 208 S.E.2d 681 (No. Carolina 1 9 7 4 ) ;
Application of Kauai Elec. Division, Etc., 590 P. 2d 524 (Hawaii
1978).
5U

South Central Bell Teleph. Co. v. Kentucky Utilities Comm'n,
637 S.W.2d 649 (Kentucky 1982); General Teleph. Co. of the
Southwest v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 652 P.2d 1200 (New
Mexico 1 9 8 2 ) ; Re Northwestern Bell Teleph. Co., 3 PUR4th 473
(] 973) .
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equity may be granted for utility efficiency.55

No state

supreme court has prohibited a commission from ordering a higher
return on equity because of efficiency.56
Respondent and Intervenors believe that the best view is
that a utility commission's decision on rate of return should be
upheld as it is within a range of reasonableness.57

In a recent

Utah Power & Light rate case, the Utah Commission acknowledged
that an increase in the rate of return may be appropriate for
utility efficiency:
.•.we recognize that management performance is an
appropriate factor for the Commission to consider in

LaSalle Teleph. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 157
So.2d 455 (Louisiana 1963); New England Teleph. and Telegr. Co. v.
New Hampshire, 183 A. 2d 237 (New Hampshire 1962); Gulf Power Co. v.
Cresse, 410 So.2d 492 (Florida 1982).
56

State utility commissions are likewise divided on
adjustments to rate of return for either utility efficiency or
inefficiency.
The commissions of Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia, Missouri, California and Iowa
have granted both higher returns for efficiency and lower returns
for inefficiency. The commissions of Arkansas, Illinois, Texas,
Vermont, North Carolina and Idaho have ordered lower rates of
return for utility inefficiency. The commissions of New Mexico,
New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania have awarded higher rates of return
for utility efficiency. See PUR Digest, 3d Series, Return, § 36.
The New Hampshire commission explicitly refused to order a higher
rate of return for utility efficiency on the theory that the
utility "should not be rewarded for what it is supposed to do
anyway."
Re Gas Service, Inc., 69 NH PUC 291, DR 83-345,
Supplemental Order No. 17,061 dated June 4, 1984, cited at PUR
Digest, 3d Series, § 36, Return, at p. 1000.
57

The range of reasonableness determined by the Commission was
from 11.6% to something less than 13%. Order on Application for
Rehearing issued January 10, 1991, at 4.
R. at 2164.
The
Commission's authorized return of 12.1% was within that range.
28

settinq a return on equity within a reasonable
range.
There i s a compelling public policy reason for upholding the
Commission in adjusting rate of return for either efficiency or
mismanagement ,
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Docket No. 89-035-10 Report and Order issued February 9,
1990. It should be noted, however, that even though the Commission
expressed this policy statement, it refused to grant an upward
adjustment in UP&L's rate of return for efficient management in.
this instance. Report and Order at 12.
39

See Mountain Fuel's July b, 19 9 1 lettei
Secretary Stephen C . Hewlet t
R , a t. 2 74 7 •• 8 .
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to

Commission

*i

The only evidence which is before this Court on rate of return is
that of Division witness Nile Eatmon and Committee witness
Mattiyahu Marcus.

The Division and the Committee (not the

Company) requested that this evidence be certified for appeal.60
Further, Mountain Fuel did not marshal the evidence of Division
witnesses Phillip Teumim, Robert Parente or Michael Harrison, or
Committee witnesses Richard Galligan, Thomas Catlin or Jerry
Mierzwa, all of whom offered testimony which was used by the
Commission to justify its rate of return adjustment.61

For the

reasons stated in Part II.A. above, the Commission's findings on
rate of return are conclusive.
C.

THE COMMISSION'S ADJUSTMENT TO RATE OF RETURN
WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Mountain Fuel's argument that the Commission had no
evidentiary basis for finding that Mountain Fuel's customers were
adversely affected by what it perceived as an undesirable
corporate structure is inaccurate.62

The Commission stated in

its order that it was concerned that affiliate relationships have
constrained and inhibited the pursuit of a least-cost gas supply

60

See Appendix 3.

61

The Division witnesses were consultants from Theodore Barry
and Assc. and the Committee witnesses were consultants from Exeter
and Assc.
62

In addition to the testimony cited below, three Committee
witnesses from Exeter: Richard Galligan, Thomas Catlin and Jerry
Mierzwa, testified on September 18, 1990 about the problems caused
by Mountain Fuel's affiliate relationships.
Even though the
Commission relied on this evidence for some of its findings (R. at
1996-2005), none of this testimony is part of the record on appeal.
30
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The Commission further found that while Questar Pipeline's
rates and rate structure can adversely affect Mountain Fuel and
its core customers, Mountain Fuel never intervened to represent
its customers' interests at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) where such rates are determined.

R at 1993.

Mountain Fuel testified that it did not appear in FERC
proceedings because it did not want to be at odds with its sister
affiliate Questar Pipeline and because that "doesn't carry out
the fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders" of Questar
Corporation.

R at 1173.

The Commission also revalued portions of a real estate
transaction between Mountain Fuel and its affiliate, Interstate
Land.

The Commission found that this transaction placed

ratepayers at a disadvantage that could not be entirely
controlled or offset.

R. at 1979-80. This concern about the

lack of arms length negotiating between Mountain Fuel and its
affiliates was at the heart of the Commission's decision to
reduce Petitioner's rate of return.65 Mountain Fuel seems
displeased that the Commission is determined to examine the
general corporate structure of Questar Corporation.66

General

regulatory principles however, require that a Commission strictly

65

43.

See Report and Order issued November 21, 1990 at 17-20, 34R. at 1979-1982, 1996-2005.

66

See Petitioner's Opening Brief, page 43, footnote 32.
32

scrutinize a f f i 1 i at *» I fr-inscirt inns aim I i e 1.11.1 mush 1 ps ,
CONCLUSION
Careful review and an^iypiH

r Appellant's arguments and

dnt hut I t les 1 uvud i s t h .

.

that the Commission erred on i.^t

V-VJ:

return.

*

.Mountain Fuel has l a n e u

upportr Appellant's claims
>' r t,a.-**;, or ratt: of
*

supportina * < Commiss : O P ' <= findings c;.,a
supported 1; substantial evidence.
by t he we i cv

'

•* ^

Therefore, Respondent
that the Commission's
1> AT El> t l i i r ,

l

•

*'• *-*. • ,i..-. -..
In s^ i.ndings a ~

The conclusions are supported
-

** •'

-ii;-•: Intervenors respectfully submit

r-ier -h ;::d be affirmed.

I h I 11 r, • \

. ;

December,

1991-

s>/f^>^)

David Stott, Legal Counsel
Utah Public Service Commission

Laurie Noda, Asst. Atty. Gen,
Division of Public Utilities

Kent Walgrjen, Asst. Atty, Gen.
Committee pjf Consumer Services

6/

See Priest, Principles of Public Utility Regulation, Vol.
I , p , 80. See also. Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 595 P. 2d 871 (Utah 1979); Town of New Shoreham v. Rhode
7^0 (Rhode Island 1983)
Island Public Util. Comm'n, 464 A,7d
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above
JOINT BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS was mailed, postage
pre-paid on this

/<£

day of December, 1991 to the following:

GARY G. SACKETT, ESQ.
Questar Corporation
180 East First South Street
P.O. Box 11150
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

by WOMAU>
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APPENDIX I

APPENDIX 1

54-3-1

Charges must be just; service adequate; rules reasonable-

Ail charges made, demanded or received by any public utility, or by any two
or more public utilities, for any product or commodity furnished or to be
furnished, or for any service rendered or to be rendered, shall be just and
reasonable. Every unjust or unreasonable charge made, demanded or received
for such product or commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared
unlawful. Every public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such service, instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will promote the safety,
health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees and the public, and
as will be in all respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. All rules and
regulations made by a public utility affecting or pertaining to its charges or
service to the public shall be just and reasonable. The scope of definition "just
and reasonable" may include^but shall not be limited to, the cost of providing
service to each category of customer, economic impact of charges on each
category of customer, and on the well-being of the state of Utah; methods of
reducing wide periodic variations in demand of such products, commodities or
services, and means of encouraging conservation of resources and energy.

54-4-4,

Classification and fixing of rates after hearing.

(1) Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing that the rates,
fares, tolls, rentals, charges or classifications, or any of them demanded, observed, charged or collected by any public utility for any service or product or
commodity, or in connection therewith, including the rates or fares for excursion or commutation tickets, or that the rules, regulations, practices or contracts, or any of them, affecting such rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or
classifications, or any of them, are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or
preferential, or in anywise in violation of any provisions of law, or that such
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or classifications are insufficient, the commission shall determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates, fares, tolls,
rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, practices or contracts to be
thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order as hereinafter provided.
(2) The commission shall have power to investigate a single rate, fare, toll,
rental, charge, classification, rule, regulation, contract or practice, or any
number thereof, or the entire schedule or schedules of rates, fares, tolls,
rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts and practices, or
any number thereof, of any public utility, and to establish, after hearing, new
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts
or practices, or schedule or schedules in lieu thereof.
(3) The commission, in its determination of just and reasonable rates, may
consider recent changes in the utility's financial condition or changes reasonably expected, but not speculative, in the utility's revenues, expenses or investments and may adopt an appropriate future test period, not exceeding
twelve months from the date of filing, including projections or projections
together with a period of actual operations in determining the utility's test
year for rate-making purposes.

54-4-21, Valuation of public utilities.
The commission shall have power to ascertain the value of the property ot
every public utility in this state and every fact which in its judgment may or
does have any bearing on such value. The commission shall have power to
make revaluations from time to time and to ascertain the value of new g&nstruction, extensions, and additions to the property of every public utility;
provided, that the valuation of the property of all public utilities doing business within this state located in Utah as recorded in accordance with Section
54-4-22 of this chapter shall be considered the actual value of the properties of
said public utilities in Utah unless otherwise changed after hearings by order
of the commission. In case the commission changes the valuation of the properties of any public utility said new valuations'found by the commission shall
be the valuations of said public utility for all purposes provided in this chapter.

54-7-19, Valuation oi utilities — Procedure — Findings
conclusive evidence,
(1) (a) In determining the value, or revaluing the property of a public utii
ity as required by Section 54-4-21, the commission may hold hearings.
(b) The commission may make a preliminary examination or investigation into the matters designated in this section and in Section 54-4-21 and
may inquire into those matters in any other investigation or hearing.
(c) The commission may seek any available sources of information.
(d) (i) The evidence introduced at the hearing shall be reduced to writing and certified under the seal of the commission.
(ii) The findings of the commission, when properly certified under
the seal of the commission, are admissible in evidence in any action,
proceeding, or hearing before the commission, and before any court as
conclusive evidence of the facts as stated.
(e) The commission's findings of facts can be controverted in a subsequent proceeding only by showing a subsequent change in conditions
bearing upon the facts.
(2) (a) The commission may hold further hearings and investigations to
make revaluations or to determine the value of any betterments, improvements, additions, or extensions made by any public utility.
(b) The commission may examine all matters that may change, modify,
or affect any finding of fact previously made, and may make additional
findings of fact to supplement findings of fact previously made.
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

Norman H Bangerter
Governor
„

Commissioners
Brian T (Ted'Stewart
Chairman
James M Bvrne

. HeberM Welts Building
r
_,
A
f 160 East 300 South 4th Floor
[ p 0 Box 45585
*•
Salt Lake Cty Utah 84145

Stephen F Mecham
C
jExecutive
* " * 1 " Staff
* Director
^
Executive Stan Director
Stephen C Hewlett

(801) 5 3 0 - 6 7 1 6

Commission Secretary

M E M O R A N D U M

TO:

Parties, Docket No. 89-057-15

FROM:

Public Service Commission

DATE:

August 27, 1990

SUBJECT:

TEST-YEAR RATE BASE; PREPARATION OF COMPREHENSIVE EXHIBIT

In this docket, parties differ on whether year-end or
average rate base is appropriate for test period purposes. We intend
to resolve the dispute early in the proceeding.
As the first matter to be taken up when the hearing begins,
each party will be expected to present, through its attorney or a
designated witness, a concise statement of the reasons for its
choice. Among other things, each statement must address, first, our
use in recent US West and Utah Power & Light cases of average rate
base in conjunction with historic test years, and second, the problem
this choice creates for matching test year revenues, expenses, and
rate base.
So that necessary information will be on hand, the
Company is directed to supply an exhibit establishing test-year rate
base using average rate base as soon as possible.
On another subject, we direct the parties to prepare a
comprehensive joint exhibit setting forth the issues under consideration in the docket, matched with descriptions of each party's
position on each issue. Parties should plan to present the exhibit
to the Commission prior to or as early in the hearing as possible.

(\ r -f r* t** ^

APPENDIX 3

a

APPENDIX 3

C

O

R

P

O

R

A

T

I

O N

Otfite

180 East First South St

Salt Lake Cit\. Utah 84111

G a n G. Sackett
Associate General Counsel

Plume (801)534-5563
Mail

P.O.Box 11150

Salt Lake Cit>, Utah 84147
Fax (801)534-5131

July 5, 1991
Stephen C. Hewlett, Secretary
Public Service Commission of Utah
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Dear Steve:

Re: Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission,
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 910051
As a follow-up to my conversations with Dave Stott and Utah Supreme Court
clerk, Geoffrey J. Butler, Mountain Fuel Supply Company would like to designate the
following additional portions of the record compiled in PSC Docket No. 89-057-15
for transmittal to the Court in connection with the captioned appeal. If there are
other portions of the record that the Commission or the two intervenors (the Utah
Division of Public Utilities and the Committee of Consumer Services) wish to designate, please call me so that we can arrive at a stipulated portion of the record
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 16.
Document

PSC
Exhibit No.

Date

Transcript of Proceedings

11-07-89

Glenn H. Robinson Direct Testimony

03-30-90

MFS-1

Glenn H. Robinson Rebuttal Testimony

08-17-90

MFS-1R

Glenn H. Robinson Exhibits

MFS-1.1 - 1.8

Alan K. Allred Direct Testimony

03-30-90

MFS-5

Alan K. Allred Rebuttal Testimony

08-17-90

MFS-5R

Alan K. Allred Exhibits

James L. Balthaser Surrebuttal Testimony

MFS-5.1, revised MFS5.2 - 5.8, MFS-5.9, MFS
5.10, revised MFS-5.11,
MFS-5.12 - 5.19
09-05-90

James L. Balthaser Exhibits
Chester G. Sullivant Direct Testimony

MFS-6SR
MFS-6.1, 6.18, 6.19

07-06-90

DPU-1

Stephen C. Hewlett

-2-

July 5, 1991

Document

Date

Chester G. Sullivant Surrebuttal Testimony

08-31-91

Chester G. Sullivant Exhibits

PSC
Exhibit No.
DPU-1SR
DPU-1.1 - 1.12

Wesley D. Huntsman Direct Testimony

07-06-90

DPU-2

Wesley D. Huntsman Surrebuttal

08-31-90

DPU-2SR

Testimony
Wesley D. Huntsman Exhibits
Carl L. Mower Surrebuttal Testimony

DPU-2.2-2.11
08-31-90

Carl L. Mower Exhibit

DPU-10
DPU-10.1

Also, I note that the PSC pagination of the record duplicates pages 1-205, with
a re-start of pagination for the September 5, 1990, transcript. To avoid confusion in
citing to the record in the briefs, it would be helpful if you would contact Mr. Butler
to discuss a solution. Also, Mountain Fuel reserves the right to specify additional
documents under Rule 16 at a later time.
If you have questions concerning this listing, please contact me so that we can
work out the appropriate details as quickly as possible.
Yours very truly,

GGS-.lsl
cc:

Utah Supreme Court
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
Public Service Commission of Utah
David L. Stott, Esq.
Committee of Consumer Services
Kent Walgren, Assistant Attorney General
Division of Public Utilities
Laurie L. Noda, Assistant Attorney General

D89-001A\PSCU917.L

|. \ State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Public Utilities

i

F/
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Executive Director
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HeberM Wells Butldmga
160 East

3°0 South/P O Box 45802

Frank Johnson 1

Salt Lake C.iy Utah 84145-0802

Division Director I

(801)530-6651

July 10, 1991
Stephen C. Hewlett, Secretary
Public Service Commission of Utah
Heber Wells Building 4th Floor
160 East 300 So.
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Re: Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 91-000-51
Dear Steve,
Pursuant to the letter I received from Gary Sackett on July 5,
1991, the Division would like to have designated the following
documents in connection with the captioned appeal.

Document

Date

PSC
Exhibit No.

Mary Cleveland
Direct Testimony

7-6-90

DPU-6

Mary Cleveland

8-31-90

DPU-6SR

Surrebuttal Testimony
Mary Cleveland Exhibits
Nile W. Eatmon
Direct Testimony
Nile W. Eatmon
Surrebuttal Testimony
Nile W. Eatmon Exhibits

DPU-6.1-6.5
7-6-90

DPU-5

8-31-90

DPU-5SR
DPU-5.1-5.6
DPU-5.1SR5.4SR

Phillip S. Teumim
Direct Testimony

7-16-90

DPU-8GS

Phillip S. Teumim
Surrebuttal Testimony

9-12-90

DPU-8SRGS

The Division reserves the right
documents under Rule 16 at a later time.

to

specify

additional

If you have any questions or problems, please let me know.

Sincerely,

(XaujuJi

/)dd^^

L a u r i e L. Noda
Assistant Attorney General
Division of Public Utilities

cc: Mountain Fuel Supply Co,
Gary Sackett
Committee of Consumer Services
Kent Walgren

O E F I O OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
,#'' OF

Tfjy^
R. PAUL VAN

/jfy
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DAM
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- ATTORNEY GENERAL
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801 5 ^ ^200 • bAX 801 S U 3216

JOSEPH E TESCH
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

STA TE OF UTAH

July 9, 1991
Stephen C. Hewlett, Secretary
Public Service Commission of Utah
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Re:

Certification of Record in Mountain Fuel Supply
Co. v." Public Service Commission, Utah Supreme
Court Case No. 910051

Dear Steve:
In response to Mr. Sackett's letter of July 5, 1991,
following are the additional parts of the record from PSC Docket
No. 89-057-15 which the Committee of Consumer Services would like
designated as part of the record. In the event further portions
of the record are needed after Mountain Fuel files its Briefs
with the Court, Mr. Sackett has stated that he will not object to
additional documents being made available to the Court pursuant
to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Document

PSC
Exhibit No,

Michael Arndt Direct Testimony

CCS-1

Michael Arndt Surrebuttal Testimony

CCS-1SR

Matty Marcus Direct Testimony

CCS-2

Matty Marcus Surrebuttal Testimony

CCS-2SR

Williamson Testimony re Green Mtn. Power
Central Vermont Public Service,
Public Service of New Hampshire
and Narragansit Transit

CCS Cross 1

Information regarding Brewery Property

CCS Cross 2

We are presuming that the Brief filed by the Committee on
September 28, 1990 and the Committee's response to Mountain
Fuel's Application for rehearing have already been certified. If

not, please consider this a formal request that they be included
with the above.
If you have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

f^MlTL
Kent Walgren
Assistant Attorney General
Committee of Consumer Services
cc:

Utah Supreme Court
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
Public Service Commission of Utah
David L. Stott, Esq.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co.
Gary Sackett, Esq
Division of Public Utilities
Laurie L. Noda, Asst. Attorney General
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fountain Fuel Supply Company
Docket No. 89-057-15

James I. Balthaser
Exhibit Mo. 6.20
Type of Test Year tod Rate Base
Used in Determining Ces Rates M

Typ« of Test
Year Allowed
1 FORECAST
2 FORECAST
3 FORECAST
4 FORECAST
$ FORECAST
6 FORECAST
7 FORECAST
S FORECAST
9 FORECAST
10 FORECAST
11 PARTIAL
12 PARTIAL
13 PARTIAL
14 PARTIAL
15 PARTIAL
16 PARTIAL
17 PARTIAL
1S PARTIAL
19 PARTIAL
20 PARTIAL
21 PARTIAL
22 PARTIAL
23 PARTIAL
24 HISTORIC
2S HISTORIC
26 HISTORIC
27 HISTORIC
28 HISTORIC
29 HISTORIC
30 HISTORIC
31 HISTORIC
32 HISTORIC
33 HISTORIC
34 HISTORIC
35 HISTORIC
36 HISTORIC
37 HISTORIC
$8 HISTORIC
39 HISTORIC
40 HISTORIC
41 HISTORIC
42 HISTORIC
43 HISTORIC
44 HISTORIC
45 HISTORIC
46 HISTORIC
47 HOT REGULATED
46 WOT SPECIFIED
49 HOT SPECIFIED
50 HOT SPEClFIEO

Agency

Type of Rate Base

MISSISSIPPI PSC
NORTH DAKOTA PSC
CALIFORNIA PUC
WISCONSIN PSC
HAWAII PUC
MINNESOTA PUC
NEW YORK PSC
NEU MEXICO PSC
MICHIGAN PSC
PENNSLYVANIA PUC
IDAHO PUC
MARYLAND-PSC
GEORGIA PSC
ALASKA PUC
0ELAWARE PSC
RHODE ISLAND PUC
VEST VIRGINIA PSC
DC PSC
COLORADO PUC
FLORIDA PSC
NEW JERSEY BPU
NEVADA PSC
OHIO PUC
WASHINGTON UTC
MONTANA PSC
LOUISIANA PSC
TENNESSEE PSC
MAINE PUC
SOUTH DAKOTA PUC
IOWA sue
NEW HAHPSHJRE PUC
SOUTH CAROLINA PSC
TEXAS RC
CONNECTICUT OPUC
MASSACHUSETTS Of>U
VERMONT FSB
OKLAHOHA CC
VIRGINIA SCC
KENTUCKY PSC
ARIZONA CC
INDIANA URC
WYOMING PSC
NORTH CAROLINA UC
KANSAS SCC
MISSOURI PSC
OREGON PUC
NEBRASKA PSC
ILLINOIS CC

AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BOTH
BOTH
YEAR ENO
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AYERACE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BOTH
BOTH
YEAR END
YEAR END
YEAR END
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
YEAR END
YEAR END
YEAR END
YEAR END
YEAR ENO
YEAR ENO
YEAR END
YEAR END
YEAR END
YEAR END
YEAR END
YEAR £UO
YEAR END
YEAR END
YEAR ENO

ALABAMA PSC
ARKANSAS PSC

BOTH
YEAR END
YEAR END

1/ MARUC Annual Report on Utility and Carrier Regulation 19S8, Table* 13 *nd 23
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Docket No. 89-057-15
Joint Exhibit No. 3
Expenses

*Issue: Joint Exhibit 2, page 5 of 11, line 13 - Year-end Depreciation
MFS
250
Explanation:

DPU
250

CCS
-0-

Annualization of 1989 depreciation to reflect year-end rate base.

MFS Position: This annualization is a known and measurable change which is necessary to match
depreciation expense with year-end rate base. Both year-end rate base and this
depreciation expense annualization should be allowed in order to reflect most accurately
the conditions during the period in which the rates will be in effect.
DPU Position: The Division recommends the annualization of 1989 depreciation to reflect year-end rate
base. The reason is that annualization changes within the test year are allowed under the
Commission's annualization policy.
CCS Position: The Committee's position is that this adjustment is neither necessary nor proper for
ratemaking purposes. The average test year approach produces the desired matching of
investment, revenues and expenses. Year-end annualizations are complex, speculative
and contrary to the Commission's intent to simplify the ratemaking process.
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Docket No. 89-05745
Joint Exhibit No. 3
Expenses

*Issue: Joint Exhibit 2, page 5 of 11, line 14 - Production-related Depreciation

MFS
277
Explanation:

DPU

ces

277

-0-

Post-test year adjustment to reflect 1990 production of Company owned gas and the
lower 1990 unit deprecation rate.

MFS Position: This adjustment is known and measurable, as it is based on the depreciation rate per unit
for 1990 and planned 1990 Company-owned gas production levels reflected in Docket
Nos. 90-057-02 and 90-057-07. The adjustment is necessary to reflect most accurately
the conditions during the test year in which the rates will be in effect.
DPU Position: The Division adjusted depreciation at December 31, 1989 year ending levels to reflect
the use of year end rate base. The Division did not use average rate base. The Division
used year end rate base because it felt that it more accurately reflect the conditions that
would exist at the time rates go into effect.
CCS Position: The Committee's position is that this adjustment is neither necessary nor proper for
ratemaking purposes. The average test year approach produces the desired matching of
investment, revenues and expenses. Year-end annualizations are complex, speculative
and contrary to the Commission's intent to simplify the ratemaking process.
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